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Abstract
We consider the problem of pricing items in order to maximize the revenue
obtainable from a set of single minded customers. We relate the tractability
of the problem to structural properties of customers’ valuations: the prob-
lem admits an efficient approximation algorithm, parameterized along the
inhomogeneity of the valuations.
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1. Introduction
Problem definition. Let I = {1, . . . ,m} represent a set of items for sale and
let J = {1, . . . , n} represent a set of potential customers. Every customer
j ∈ J requests a subset of items, denoted Ij ⊆ I. We refer to these sub-
sets as bundles. Customers are single minded, which refers to the fact that
they are interested in their particular bundle only. The valuation vj for each
bundle Ij, j ∈ J , is publicly known. This is reasonable when assuming cus-
tomers’ rationality and a competitive market environment: any customer
can observe the publicly known prices for her bundle at all companies in the
market, and then, behaving rationally, the customer defines her valuation
being the cheapest market price for her bundle. We assume vj > 0, j ∈ J ,
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for otherwise the customers having non-positive valuations can be deleted
from the instance. We assume the items are available in unlimited supply,
that is to say, we deal with digital goods or services. Let pi be the price
for item i ∈ I. We refer to the set W = W (p) = {j ∈ J | ∑i∈Ij pi ≤ vj}
as the set of winners. The bundle pricing problem asks for a vector of item
prices p = (p1, . . . , pm) such that the total revenue Π(p) =
∑
j∈W (p)
∑
i∈Ij pi
is maximal. Let us denote by Π the maximal revenue that can be extracted
from the given set of customers.
Related work. The bundle pricing problem was introduced in combinatorial
optimization literature by Guruswami et al. [5]. They show that the problem
is APX-hard. Later, Demaine et al. [1] prove that the problem is inapprox-
imable by a semi-logarithmic factor in the number of customers n. On the
positive side, Guruswami et al. [5] present a polynomial time O(log n+logm)-
approximation algorithm. Hartline and Koltun [6] design near-linear and
near-cubic time approximation schemes under the assumption that the num-
ber of distinct items m is constant. Under the monotonicity condition that
the total price of any bundle does not exceed the total price of any bigger
bundle, Grigoriev et al. [3] show that the problem is still NP-hard but admits
a polynomial time approximation scheme.
Our result. In this note we interpret customers’ valuations in such a way that
we come a step closer towards understanding the complexity of the problem.
To start with, let us make the following definition.
Definition 1. For any instance of the bundle pricing problem, define b¯j =
vj/|Ij| as the average (per item) valuation of customer j, and define the
inhomogeneity of valuations as
α = max
j,k∈J
{
b¯j/b¯k
}
.
Notice that α ≥ 1, and that the problem becomes trivial as soon as the
valuations are homogeneous (that is, α = 1 and b¯j =: b¯ for all j). In this
case, setting the price for each item i ∈ I uniformly at pi = b¯, we obtain the
optimal solution.
In contrast to the trivially solvable homogeneous case, the problem with
inhomogeneity of valuations is NP-hard. While this does not sound very
surprising, the main point is that the NP-hardness holds even if the inhomo-
geneity α is bounded from above by any constant 1 + ε. In some sense, we
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thereby delineate the borderline between triviality and NP-hardness for the
bundle pricing problem.
For the fact that the bundle pricing problem is NP-hard even for inho-
mogeneity arbitrarily close to 1, consider the NP-hardness reduction from
Independent Set to the bundle pricing problem presented in Grigoriev et
al. [3]. In this reduction, all average valuations of the bundles are at least M
and at most M + 1, where M is a chosen large number. The NP-hardness
result for α ≤ 1 + ε, ε > 0, follows straightforwardly. Moreover, the reduc-
tion works even under stronger restrictions on customers’ valuations, namely
monotonicity : vj ≤ vk for any j, k ∈ J such that Ij ⊂ Ik. Thus, we proved
the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The bundle pricing problem is strongly NP-hard even if inho-
mogeneity α ≤ 1 + ε for any ε > 0, and if the valuations are monotone.
In the next section we present a parametric approximation algorithm
for the bundle pricing problem that complements the NP-hardness result.
The proposed O(n(log n + m))-time algorithm has performance guarantee
1+lnα+ε, for any ε > 0. Notice that this is a constant-factor approximation
algorithm as soon as the inhomogeneity α of valuations is bounded by some
constant, and the semi-logarithmic inapproximability result of Demaine et
al. [1] is not longer valid. We believe that a constant bound on α is not
unreasonable in practical applications.
2. O(lnα)-approximation algorithm
The idea of the approximation algorithm is as follows. We partition the
set of customers J into O(lnα) subsets S1, . . . , SK , such that in each subset
any two customers have average valuations different from each other by at
most a constant factor δ > 1. Denote by Πk the maximum revenue for the
bundle pricing problem restricted to the set of customers Sk (referred to
as Sk-restricted problem). Then
∑K
k=1 Πk is clearly an upper bound for the
optimum Π of the original problem. Therefore, the highest maximum revenue
maxk=1,...,K Πk over all restricted problems is at least Π/K. Next, from the
fact that the inhomogeneity of the average valuations in Sk is bounded by
at most factor of δ, we derive that for the Sk-restricted problem there exists
a price vector generating revenue at least Πk/δ. Thus, taking the price
vector yielding the highest revenue over all restricted problems, we generate
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a revenue at least Π/δK. Finally, we optimize the performance guarantee
over parameters K and δ.
To partition the set of customers J into subsets S1, . . . , SK , we use the
following recursive procedure running in K steps. At step k = 1, . . . , K, we
construct subset Sk. Consider the set of customers Jk not yet assigned to
any of the subsets S1, . . . , Sk−1, assuming J1 = J . Add all customers j ∈ Jk
to Sk for which b¯j ≤ δkb¯min, where b¯min = minj∈J{b¯j} and δ > 1 to be defined
later. Set Jk+1 = Jk \ Sk and recurse on this set.
By definition of the inhomogeneity α, we have b¯k ≤ αb¯j for every pair of
customers k, j ∈ J . Then, by straightforward induction on k, one can prove
that the ratio between the highest and the lowest average valuations in Jk is
at most α/δk−1, yielding K ≤ 1+logδ α = 1+lnα/ ln δ. Thus, we derived the
first ingredient of the approximation algorithm, formulated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. For any δ > 1, the number of subsets K is at most 1+lnα/ ln δ.
Second, we show that there is a solution to the Sk-restricted problem
such that (i) the set of winners W = Sk; and (ii) the revenue generated in
this solution is at least Πk/δ. Consider the price vector p
k = (pk1, . . . , p
k
m)
where price pki of item i ∈ I is determined as follows. Let Sik ⊆ Sk be
the set of customers requesting item i. If Sik = ∅, then price pki can be
chosen arbitrarily. If Sik 6= ∅, define pki = min{b¯j| j ∈ Sik}. Now, consider
a customer j ∈ Sk. By definition of price vector pk, the price of bundle Ij
is
∑
i∈Ij p
k
i ≤
∑
i∈Ij b¯j = vj, and therefore j ∈ W . By definition of set Sk,
maxj∈Sk b¯j/minj∈Sk b¯j ≤ δ, that yields a revenue at least Πk/δ. Thus, we
proved the following lemma.
Lemma 3. In the Sk-restricted problem, price vector p
k yields a revenue at
least Πk/δ.
Now, we are ready to present our first approximation result.
Theorem 4. The bundle pricing problem admits an e(1+lnα)-approximation
algorithm with computation time O(n(log n+m)).
Proof. The combination of Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 immediately implies
that the revenue generated by the best price vector from {pk| k = 1, . . . , K}
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is at least Π/δ(1 + lnα
ln δ
), which is maximized for δ = e
“
1
2
+
√
1
4
+ 1
lnα
”−1
. The
claim follows from the fact that for big α the value of δ is close to e.
We arrive at the computation time as follows. First, in O(n log n) time
we order the customers according to their average valuation (increasingly).
Then, for all k = 1, . . . , K, we use binary search to create set Sk in O(log n)
time. For all items i = 1, . . . ,m, we determine the set of customers that
request the item. This requires O(nm) total time. So, the total computation
time is O(n log n + K(log n + nm)), which is in O(n(log n + m)), as K is a
constant. 
3. Improved analysis
There are several directions for improvement of the obtained approximate
solution to the bundle pricing problem. First, instead of the constructed price
vectors pk, k = 1, . . . , K, we can use price vectors maximizing the revenue
in the Sk-restricted problems, with given set of winners W = Sk. Notice
that, for any set of winners W ⊆ J , the price vector maximizing the revenue
obtained from W can be found in polynomial time by solving a simple linear
program; see [2, 5]. Unfortunately, this approach does not necessarily lead
to any provable improvement of the performance guarantee.
The following approach allows us to slightly improve the performance
guarantee; it is simply based on a more careful analysis. By construction
of the partition of J , for any two subsets Sk and Sk′ , k ≤ k′, the average
valuation of any customer from Sk is at most the average valuation of a
customer from Sk′ . Therefore, for any k = 1, . . . , K, and for all k
′ ≥ k, if Sk ⊆
W , then Sk′ ⊆ W as well. By definition of the subsets, the maximum average
valuation in set Sk+1 is at most δ times the maximum average valuation in
set Sk. Thus, we have that the revenue generated by price vector p
k applied
to the set of customers J is at least
Rk =
1
δ
Πk +
1
δ2
Πk+1 + . . .+
1
δK−k+1
ΠK , ∀k = 1, . . . , K.
These equalities can be equivalently represented by the following recurrent
formulas
Rk =
1
δ
Πk +
1
δ
Rk+1, ∀k = 1, . . . , K − 1; (1)
RK =
1
δ
ΠK . (2)
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Summing up all Equations (1) and (2) and dividing both sides by K, we
derive
R¯ =
1
K
K∑
k=1
Rk =
1
Kδ
K∑
k=1
Πk +
1
Kδ
K∑
k=1
Rk − 1
Kδ
R1.
Let R1 = φR¯. Since
∑K
k=1 Πk ≥ Π, we derive
R¯ ≥ Π
K(δ − 1) + φ.
Taking the maximum revenue over all price vectors pk, k = 1, . . . , K, we
obtain
max
k=1,...,K
Rk ≥ max{R1, R¯} ≥ max
{
φΠ
K(δ − 1) + φ,
Π
K(δ − 1) + φ
}
,
that is minimized with φ = 1, yielding
max
k=1,...,K
Rk ≥ Π
δ(1 + lnα
ln δ
)− lnα
ln δ
.
Note that δ(1 + lnα
ln δ
)− lnα
ln δ
< δ lnα+ δ. Given ε > 0, let δ = 1 + ε/(lnα+ 1).
Then,
δ lnα + δ =
(
1 +
ε
lnα + 1
)
lnα +
(
1 +
ε
lnα + 1
)
= 1 + lnα + ε,
and we arrive at the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For any ε > 0, the bundle pricing problem admits an (1 +
lnα + ε)-approximation algorithm with computation time O(n(log n+m)).
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